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School districts across the country have struggled to increase the proportion of students taking 
algebra by 8
th  grade,  thought to be an important milestone on the pathway to college 
preparedness. We highlight key features of a research collaboration between the Wake County 
Public School System and Harvard University that have enabled investigation of one such effort 
to solve this problem. In 2010, the district began assigning middle school students to accelerated 
math coursework leading to 8
th grade algebra on the basis of a clearly defined measured of prior 
academic skill. We document two important facts. First, use of this new rule greatly reduced the 
relationship between course assignment and student factors such as income and race while 
increasing the relationship between course assignment and academic skill. Second, using  a 
regression discontinuity analytic strategy, we show that the assignment rule had strong impacts 
on  the fraction of students on track to complete algebra by 8
th  grade. Students placed in 
accelerated math were exposed to higher-skilled peers but larger class sizes. We describe future 
plans for assessing impacts on achievement and high school course-taking outcomes.  
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  INTRODUCTION 
 
Several years ago, the Wake County Public School System (WCPSS) in North Carolina 
sought a strategy to provide equitable access to appropriate and rigorous mathematics courses in 
the middle grades and to ensure access to Algebra I by the 8
th grade for academically prepared 
students.  In particular,  the district hoped to increase  the disproportionately low  rates of 
enrollment in advanced math coursework among black students, Hispanic students, and students 
from low-income households.  To support  this goal, in the 2010-2011 school year, WCPSS 
enacted a mathematics course assignment policy based on a numeric criterion developed by the 
SAS Institute’s Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) to determine student 
eligibility for an accelerated math curriculum in the 6
th and 7
th grades and for placement in 
Algebra I in the 8
th grade. District officials believed that increasing students’ access to such 
coursework prior to high school would, in turn, increase their subsequent academic opportunities 
and, specifically, their likelihood of completing a rigorous, college-preparatory sequence of high 
school mathematics. 
While several educational agencies have recently attempted to address such goals through 
grade-specific, algebra-for-all policies, WCPSS leadership believed that mandating every student 
into an accelerated course would be inappropriate, as such a policy action might lead to certain 
students enrolling in courses for which they were not academically prepared. Instead, the district 
identified the EVAAS-generated measure, a predicted probability of success on the North 
Carolina End-of-Course assessment in Algebra I, as an objective measure with which to 
standardize the process of assigning students to mathematics courses in the middle grades. Such 
a measure would identify students who might be overlooked for the recommendation to take 
accelerated-level courses as a result of variation in course grading practices and subjective Algebra access and advancement 
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beliefs about which students are capable of success in these courses. These subjective practices 
and beliefs, district officials argued, rest with teachers or counselors who might otherwise make 
recommendations on the basis of student characteristics, such as race/ethnicity or socioeconomic 
status, even conditional on demonstrated ability (Hui, 2011).  
In EVAAS, district leadership believed it found a measure that would reduce or eliminate 
such bias, increase overall enrollment in accelerated  mathematics coursework in the middle 
grades, and importantly, increase enrollment specifically for students who were, up to that point, 
under-represented in such courses. They reasoned that students who had proven themselves 
capable of success based on their prior test scores would flourish academically, become more 
engaged in their schoolwork, and gain access to more accelerated mathematics courses while in 
high school. WCPSS also contended the structure  of the policy would both encourage 
acceleration into Algebra I for appropriately prepared 8
th grade students (somewhat analogous to 
single-grade, algebra-for-all policies used in other districts) and improve the overall pipeline for 
advanced math by impacting the placement of rising 6
th and 7
th graders into advanced math 
courses, setting them on course for Algebra I in the 8
th grade. 
By virtue of our team’s collective connections to the Center for  Education Policy 
Research (CEPR) at Harvard University and the Strategic Data Project, a research-education 
agency partnership housed at CEPR, we have built a partnership between WCPSS personnel and 
academic researchers in order to investigate the implementation of the district’s middle grades 
mathematics assignment policy and its impact on student outcomes. This collaborative effort 
seeks to generate evidence that will inform both the WCPSS district leadership as well as the 
broader mathematics education policy community about the potential benefits and consequences 
of an assignment strategy such as that currently used in Wake County.  Algebra access and advancement 
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In this article, we describe the initial phase of this ongoing investigation, focusing on 
evidence about how the assignment rule was implemented, the extent to which it achieved the 
goal of improving equitable access to advanced math coursework, and how the rule establishes 
the opportunity for future study of the impact of accelerated coursework on student outcomes. 
We begin by describing the research and policy context related to math course and algebra 
assignment policies. We then describe the WCPSS assignment policy in detail. Given the focus 
of this issue, we next describe the broader Strategic Data Project partnership that has facilitated 
this investigation. Following this, we detail the data used in our exploration of the WCPSS math 
assignment strategy and discuss the identification strategy we employ for understanding the 
causal impacts of acceleration in middle grades mathematics on several student-level outcomes.  
We find four main results. First, overall rates of math acceleration increased substantially 
after implementation of the assignment rule. Second, the policy succeeded in moving the district 
towards  the goal of equalizing  access to advanced math coursework,  both  by increasing 
enrollment among black students, Hispanic students, and students from lower-income families, 
and by reducing the role of these demographic factors in the course-assignment process. Third, 
relative to non-accelerated students, accelerated students’ math classes had much more 
academically skilled peers and were substantially larger. Fourth, the discontinuity in coursework 
generated at the eligibility threshold is sufficiently large and precise to serve as an instrument for 
various student outcomes that will be explored in later work. After discussing these results, the 
final section concludes with discussions of next steps in this ongoing partnership between the 
school district and academic researchers.  
 




In the United  States, mathematics achievement is often regarded as essential for 
individual educational and economic success as well as national global competitiveness (Chazan, 
2008; The College Board, 2000). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that increasing the number of 
years of mathematics required of students raises earnings, especially among students from 
minority or economically disadvantaged groups (Goodman, 2012). Beginning with Sputnik in 
1957, continuing with A Nation at Risk (Gardner, 1983) and still in more recent reports (see, for 
example, National Mathematics Advisory Panel, 2008; Brown et al, 2013), policymakers have 
called for increased proficiency in math as a national imperative. Efforts thus have focused on 
increasing the amount and rigor of mathematics course taking, with a particular focus on 
exposure to algebra (Adelman, 2006). As a key prerequisite for a sequence of courses 
culminating in college-level classes such as calculus and statistics, Algebra I is considered a 
critical “gatekeeper” course (Adelman, 2006; Education Commission of the States, 2008; 
Rickles, 2013; Walston & McCarroll, 2010).  
With this gateway status recognized, Algebra I enrollment rates have increased over the 
last two decades, with significant growth at the 8
th grade level (Walston & McCarroll, 2010). 
Concurrently, algebra course-taking in later grades has declined, reflecting the push for algebra 
earlier in students’ mathematics careers (Stein, Kaufman, Sherman, & Hillen, 2011). Yet, this 
shift has not been experienced uniformly. For example, among 8
th graders, black students and 
Hispanic students continue to enroll in Algebra I at rates lower than their white counterparts 
(Domina, 2014; Gamoran & Hannigan, 2000; Stein et al, 2011), even conditional on prior 
achievement (Walston & McCarroll, 2010). This may be due to a combination of differences in 
mathematical preparedness and course placement practices. In addition, black students and Algebra access and advancement 
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Hispanic students may disproportionately attend schools in which algebra is not offered in the 
middle school years. Nevertheless, concerns about the equality of access to algebra courses 
remain and have been foregrounded in recent years, particularly given evidence of the positive 
outcomes associated with taking algebra.  
Research has documented the relationship between algebra enrollment and a variety of 
educational and economic outcomes (Adelman, 2006; NCTM, 1989; Gamoran & Hannigan, 
2000; Ham & Walker, 1999, Ma, 2005; Stein et al, 2011). Yet, much of this research suffers 
from likely selection bias (Rickles, 2013; Stein et al, 2011) and therefore does not support causal 
claims about the impact of algebra. Typically, students are assigned to algebra coursework based 
on a combination of teacher or counselor recommendation, prior achievement, and student or 
parent preferences. A concern that arises from such course selection processes relates to those 
students who may be overlooked. Together with factors such as teacher expectations and school 
course offerings, students who are prepared for a course may nonetheless be excluded. Indeed, 
even among those sufficiently prepared, certain demographic groups are not proportionally 
represented in algebra courses (Domina, 2014; Stein et al, 2011; Stone 1998; Walston & 
McCarroll, 2010).  
In response to concerns regarding equity in exposure to algebra, many policymakers have 
advocated for early and universal access to algebra, with some districts and states mandating 
Algebra I for all 9
th grade students (as in Chicago, see Allensworth, Nomi, Montgomery, & Lee,  
2009 and Nomi, 2012) and others for all 8
th grade students (e.g. Burris, Heubert, & Levin, 2006; 
Silver, 1995; and, for an account of a statewide policy in California, see Bitter & O’Day, 2010). 
The “Algebra-for-All” movement has generated substantial debate (Loveless, 2008; Schneider, 
2009; Silver, 1995), at the heart of which lies a tension regarding student readiness for algebra. Algebra access and advancement 
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As was the concern in WCPSS, selective entry may deny access to those prepared for the course, 
placing unfair barriers to future opportunities. Yet, universal enrollment  may  force 
underprepared students into a course in which they may not be successful, particularly without 
additional supports. Additionally, universal policies may yield unintended or unanticipated 
adjustments by schools and teachers, undermining the aims of the policy. For example, while 
some schools may adapt pedagogy in rigorous ways to meet the needs of a more heterogeneous 
population, others may “water down” the curriculum and nevertheless perpetuate previous 
systems of inequality (Schneider, 2009). Universal policies also implicitly mandate changes to 
students’ preparation for algebra, having curricular implications for the grades prior to those in 
which students take algebra. These changes may not occur in practice. Simply mandating that all 
students take algebra without giving attention to their preparation, what an algebra course entails, 
or how it is taught may be damaging to the very students the policy was intended to help.  
Despite ongoing debates, limited causal evidence exists on universal algebra policies 
(Rickles, 2013; Stein et al, 2011). Researchers unsurprisingly find that universal policies increase 
algebra enrollment (Allensworth, et al, 2009; Burris et al, 2006; Everson & Dunham, 1996; Stein 
et al, 2011). Impacts on student achievement, however, are mixed (Stein et al, 2011). Clotfelter 
et al. (2012a, 2012b) find negative effects of accelerating low-skilled students into Algebra I in 
9
th  grade. Ninth grade universal algebra in Chicago negatively impacted the mathematics 
achievement of high-skilled students placed in heterogeneous classes (Nomi, 2012). While the 
Chicago policy increased overall algebra credit accumulation, it also increased failure rates 
across ability groups, and it did not lead to improved standardized test scores (Allensworth et al, 
2009). For low performing students assigned to a “double dose” of algebra,
1 the policy yielded 
positive short-term impacts on GPA and standardized test scores (Nomi & Allensworth, 2009) 
                                                            
1 A "double dose" of algebra means that a student takes two periods of algebra per day. Algebra access and advancement 
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but also an increase in course failure rates. In the longer term, the double-dose strategy yielded 
positive effects on ACT performance, high school graduation, and college entrance (Cortes, 
Goodman, & Nomi, forthcoming). Thus, there may be promise for algebra enrollment policies 
when combined with appropriate support for underprepared students, although care must be 
taken with how such policies are implemented (Nomi & Allensworth, 2013). 
In the face of ongoing debates and mixed evidence on universal placement strategies, 
practitioners and policymakers have begun to seek alternative, objective mechanisms to advance 
students’ mathematics trajectories and to identify policies that might best encourage early and 
equitable exposure for students who are prepared.  The  recent WCPSS  policy relying  on  an 
objective measure to target students for  acceleration  provides an  important opportunity  to 
understand the benefits and consequences of alternative mathematics course assignment 
strategies. 
 
POLICY OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT   
Historically, about 30 percent of WCPSS 8
th graders have enrolled in Algebra I annually. 
Responding to concerns that the demographics of the 8
th grade students enrolling in Algebra I did 
not reflect those of the district overall, the school board, along with a task force focused on 
economically disadvantaged students, sought to ensure that all students who demonstrated the 
potential to be successful in accelerated mathematics courses and Algebra I in the middle grades 
both had access to and were encouraged to enroll in the course.  
As a result, the district designed and implemented a targeted middle-grades math 
enrollment strategy. Beginning in the 2010-2011 academic year, the district identified students 
for accelerated mathematics and pre-algebra  in  the  6
th  and 7
th  grades, respectively,  and for Algebra access and advancement 
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Algebra I in the 8
th  grade  utilizing a proprietary numeric criterion developed by the SAS 
Institute’s Education  Value-Added Assessment System  (EVAAS).  The EVAAS prediction 
model capitalizes on extant student test score information (e.g., standardized End-of-Grade test 
scores from all available prior grades) and specifically predicts each student’s probability for 




students with a 70% or higher probability of achieving Level III on the Algebra I EOC exam, the 
policy recommends placement  for 6
th  grade  accelerated  math  and 7
th  grade  Pre-Algebra, 
respectively, putting these students on track for Algebra I in the 8
th grade. For 8
th grade students 
with a 70%  probability  or higher  of earning a Level III on the Algebra I EOC, the policy 




PARTNERSHIP AND LONGITUDINAL DATA 
Given the focus of this Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis special issue on 
research partnerships that use data and rigorous analytic methods to inform educational practice, 
the details and structure of the relationship that paved the way for this investigation  bear 
description. All of the authors on this paper are currently or were previously affiliated with 
Harvard University as students, faculty or staff researchers and are currently affiliated with the 
Center for Education Policy Research (CEPR) at Harvard. CEPR is the hosting entity of the 
Strategic Data Project (SDP).  
The Strategic Data Project (SDP) was formed in 2008 with funding from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation.  The goal of SDP is to transform the use of data in education to 
                                                            
2 The Algebra EOC exam is the North Carolina state standardized test that all students must complete at the end of 
Algebra I and is required of students who have taken the course. The exam is counted as part of the final course 
grade for each student.  
3 Level III represents a passing score on the North Carolina Algebra I end-of-course exam. Algebra access and advancement 
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improve student achievement.  Two fundamental and related challenges were at the heart of 
SDP’s genesis.  First, school districts are awash in data but often lack capacity to conduct 
analyses that have the potential to inform practice and decision making.  Second, while 
educational research had contributed to our collective understanding on important topics such as 
teacher effectiveness and retention, alternative certification programs, and college-going 
outcomes, most districts lacked the opportunity to learn about these topics in their own contexts 
and with their own data (Hess & Fullerton, 2008).  Seeking to address these challenges, SDP 
began as a pilot partnership between CEPR and two school districts: Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Schools and the District of Columbia Public Schools and has since grown to include over 60 
partner agencies, including school districts, state education agencies, charter management 
organization and non-profits.
4  
SDP utilizes several strategies in working towards this mission. The SDP research team 
utilizes data from each partner agency’s administrative information systems to conduct detailed, 
descriptive analyses related to students’ college readiness and success as well as human capital 
and teacher effectiveness to better inform that particular agency’s strategic planning, 
management and decision making and to encourage its continued use of data for such purposes. 
These analyses are referred to as the SDP diagnostics. Data gathered to support the diagnostics 
includes detailed longitudinal information on students, such as demographic characteristics, 
courses taken, years enrolled and measures of academic achievement, including course grades 
and standardized test scores. Data also include teacher-level information, such as demographic 
characteristics, educational  and licensure background, the number of years for which each 
teacher has been with the district, and the specific courses and groups of students each teacher 
teaches. While these data are typically pulled from a number of disparate data sources and 
                                                            
4 For more information about the Strategic Data Project, please see www.strategicdataproject.org. Algebra access and advancement 
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governing entities throughout an agency, the SDP research team works to bring the various 
elements into several unified files for analysis.  Because of the research relationship that 
proceeded WCPSS joining SDP, the district and Harvard University had already established 
agreements  and security protocols  to enable the sharing of student-  and teacher-level data 
between the two organizations.  These agreements were then updated  (and data refreshed) 
through the continuation of the SDP relationship.  
In 2011, WCPSS joined on as a partnership district with SDP. Prior to becoming a formal 
SDP partner, WCPSS had contracted with CEPR to conduct a set of descriptive analyses focused 
on trends in achievement gaps by salient student characteristics, such as race / ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status. The district had undergone a leadership change, and then-incoming (now 
former) superintendent  requested these analyses to provide a third-party look at academic 
achievement trends among the district’s students. Through the process of conducting these 
analyses, members of our team had the opportunity to learn about the context and policy efforts 
underway in the district. These early conversations led to mutual interest in WCPSS signing on 
as a partner district in the Strategic Data Project and in investigating district efforts, such as the 
newly established middle-grades math assignment policy. 
As the relationship was being established contractually, the SDP team was able to learn 
about the district’s impetus for implementing the policy and was able to underscore the unique 
opportunity, given the structure of the policy, to investigate its impact with a rigorous, quasi-
experimental research design. With the formation of the SDP relationship, the district and CEPR 
researchers agreed that understanding the impact of the middle-grades math assignment policy 
would be a focus of the ongoing research partnership.   Algebra access and advancement 
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Perhaps most critical to the success of this project, SDP places Strategic Data Fellows 
within each of its partner agencies. The SDP Fellows are skilled quantitative analysts selected 
through a national recruitment process to serve in a two-year fellowship in one of the SDP 
partner agencies. The role of the fellow in each agency is to improve data inquiry and data-
driven decision making.  Fellows contribute time to working on and facilitating the SDP 
diagnostics as well as conducting key projects that are both of import to the district and related to 
each fellow’s substantive domains of interest. As part of his fellowship work within WCPSS, 
Darryl Hill, a member of this project’s team, took on the WCPSS math placement policy as a key 
component of his portfolio of work for the district.  
Hill’s position within the district has been an integral aspect of this project for a number 
of reasons. First, he was able to learn, first hand, about the details and intricacies of the various 
WCPSS data systems. In addition to facilitating the assembly of the original data files required 
for the SDP diagnostics, he was also able to gather data elements required for this particular 
investigation that were not part of the diagnostic data sets. For example, he was able to gather the 
individual-level EVAAS probabilities for all students in WCPSS. He was able to develop an 
intimate understanding of the data’s idiosyncrasies which he gained by working directly with the 
district’s various data owners. Second, Hill was physically close and had direct access to the 
district staff members integrally involved in the development and implementation of the policy 
under exploration. This access afforded him the opportunity to talk regularly with district leaders 
about their intentions and visions for the WCPSS math assignment strategy. Third, his position 
as a researcher within the district afforded him access to school leaders and teachers responsible 
for responding to the district’s charge  of  implementing the new strategy for math course 
placement. By traveling to many of the district’s schools, Hill was able to talk directly with Algebra access and advancement 
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school leaders and mathematics teachers and learn about the on-the-ground context in which the 
policy was being implemented across schools. He learned about schools’ site-specific approaches 
to the policy’s implementation. This included learning about both the structures and services 
schools put in place to support students struggling in accelerated mathematics as well as the 
perceived needs the schools had for successful implementation. Much of what Hill learned has 
and continues to inform the group’s analytic approach. For example, Hill was able to learn that 
compliance with the policy became stronger over time as a result of a powerful directive from 
the superintendent, and that some schools grouped their students into specially created sections 
of advanced math courses that corresponded to EVAAS scores. These details led our team to 
understand why compliance with the policy appeared more modest in its first few years and 
underscored the importance of including school-level fixed effects in our modeling strategy.  
Fourth, Hill was able to represent the team’s preliminary work not only internally to 
district leadership but also externally to interested parties and community members within Wake 
County. For instance, after the team presented preliminary results at an annual academic 
conference, community members learned about the ongoing work and were interested to discuss 
its meaning and implications for students in Wake County.  Hill was able to facilitate these 
interactions with community members and utilized them as an opportunity to further educate 
about the findings to date. Finally, as the team’s work moves forward, Hill will be able to lead 
dissemination of the study’s findings within the district, for example, by presenting to bodies 
such as the district’s school board, to the superintendent’s leadership council, and to school 
leaders, teachers and community members throughout Wake County. In all of these ways, Hill’s 
presence in WCPSS allows this investigation to serve as an example of research done with a 




To examine implementation of the enrollment policy, we utilize data from WCPSS’s 
longitudinal student information system. This system assigns students unique identifiers that 
allow the district to follow their progress from primary school through secondary school. For our 
purposes, the data’s longitudinal structure facilitates this research by tracking students from the 
end of fifth grade, when they are assigned EVAAS scores that determine whether they will be 
accelerated in math, through middle and high school, during which many of our outcomes of 
interest are measured. We can track students as long as they stay within WCPSS and will explore 
whether acceleration affected the rate of attrition from the district. Without the ability to link 
student records across years, this study would not be feasible.  
Three major components of the data  are critical to the current study. First,  the data 
include student-level EVAAS scores, which provide an estimate of each student’s predicted 
probability of success in algebra, as described above. New EVAAS scores are generated 
annually for rising 7
th and 8
th graders, as further standardized test scores are incorporated into the 
calculation.  
Second, the data contain each student’s complete middle school coursework transcript. 
We can therefore observe the math courses in which students enroll and thus whether they were 
accelerated in math. Because classrooms can be uniquely identified and linked to both students 
and teachers, we can construct measures of peer composition, such as class size or average prior 
achievement, and teacher characteristics, such as years of experience or value-added. These 
classroom-level measures will help us characterize in greater detail the various channels through 
which acceleration may have affected student outcomes.  Algebra access and advancement 
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Third, the data contain information on student demographics, such as gender, 
free/reduced price lunch status, and race/ethnicity. Such variables will serve as controls in some 
regression specifications and will allow us to explore heterogeneity in program impacts.  
Finally, for future work, we are in the process of linking the transcript data to three 
important categories of outcomes that may be affected by math acceleration, namely 
standardized test scores, grades earned in middle school courses, and the high school coursework 
in which students later enroll. Standardized test scores will come from North Carolina’s End-of-
Grade (EOG) exams in math and reading comprehension, administered in the 3
rd through 8
th 
grades regardless of the specific courses in which the students were enrolled. That all students in 
a given grade receive a common assessment will allow us to explore whether acceleration 





SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Because the acceleration policy under study was first implemented in the 2010-11 school 
year, we focus largely on data for the 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years. Our main 
analytic sample consists of WCPSS students with valid EVAAS scores who entered 6
th grade in 
the 2009-10 through 2012-13 school years. We refer to these students collectively as the 2010-13 
cohorts, named for the spring of the academic year in which they first entered 6
th grade. The 
2010 cohort was subject to the new policy starting only in 7
th grade, while the subsequent three 
cohorts were subject to it starting in 6
th grade. 
Table  1  contains summary statistics for the  main analysis sample. Column 1, which 
contains all students in the sample, shows that 57% of WCPSS students in these grades are white 
or Asian and 38% are black or Hispanic. During this time period, 70% of middle school students Algebra access and advancement 
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are in accelerated math coursework, and the average EVAAS predicted probability is more than 
10 percentage points higher than the 70% eligibility threshold set by the assignment rule. In fact, 
that EVAAS threshold represents roughly the 25
th percentile of math skill in the district, so that 
the accelerated track should contain about 75% of WCPSS students if the acceleration rule were 
followed exactly. 
Columns 2 and 3 divide the sample into students in accelerated math courses and those 
not. Accelerated students are substantially more likely to be white or Asian and less likely to be 
black or Hispanic. Accelerated students have much higher math skills, whether measured by 
EVAAS or by their 5
th grade math exam z-score, the latter of which suggests a 1.3 standard 
deviation difference between the average performance of the two groups. Finally, accelerated 
students’ math classes have much more highly skilled peers, are roughly five students larger, and 
have fewer black or Hispanic peers than do the math classes of non-accelerated students.  
Before  turning to a description of the empirical strategy we will use to estimate the 
impact of math acceleration on student outcomes, we first take a broad view of the overall 
impact of the new policy on the way in which students were assigned to accelerated coursework. 
Upon implementation, the policy immediately increased rates of enrollment in middle school 
accelerated math, and placement recommendations based on this policy have been followed with 
a high (and increasing) degree of fidelity. As Figure 1 shows, the share of students in accelerated 
math in the 6
th through 8
th grades during the 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 school years was 
about 40-44  percent. That share then jumped to 55  percent in the first year of policy 
implementation and up to nearly 70 percent in the subsequent two years. In 2010-11, 71 percent 
of EVAAS-eligible students enrolled in coursework leading to or called Algebra I. By 2012-13, Algebra access and advancement 
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this figure had risen to 94 percent. Rates of acceleration have been largely flat for students 
deemed ineligible by the new policy. 
Figure 2 shows rates of math acceleration by low-income status. Acceleration rates rose 
substantially for both low income and non-low income students over this time period, though a 
large income gap in acceleration still persists in part because of the large income gap in EVAAS 
scores. Perhaps the most striking feature of these graphs is that EVAAS-eligible low-income 
students’ rates of acceleration more than doubled from 40 percent to close to 90 percent over this 
time period. We see very similar patterns when comparing black and Hispanic students to white 
and Asian students. EVAAS-eligible black and Hispanic students’ rates of acceleration also 
roughly doubled from about 45 percent to about 90 percent over this time period (not shown). 
To study how the policy improved equitable access to accelerated math more rigorously, 
in Table 2 we regress for each cohort the fraction of students’ observed middle school years 
spent in accelerated math coursework on EVAAS scores and income, race and gender indicators. 
We also include school-grade-cohort  fixed effects so that all coefficients shown are within-
school-and-cohort estimates and thus cannot be explained by student sorting across schools or 
differences across cohorts. Two patterns are striking. First, consistent with the use of EVAAS 
scores for assignment purposes, the relationship between EVAAS scores and acceleration 
monotonically increased over this time period, with the EVAAS coefficient increasing by more 
than half from the pre-policy 2009 cohort to the 2013 cohort.  
Second, large income and race gaps in acceleration rates even conditional on skill (as 
measured by EVAAS) diminished greatly over this time period. Low-income students in the 
2009 cohort spent 10.5 percentage points fewer of their middle school years in accelerated math 
coursework than did their non-low-income peers in the same school and of the same skill. For Algebra access and advancement 
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the 2012 and 2013 cohorts, this income gap had dropped to 2-3 percentage points. Black and 
Hispanic students in the 2009 cohort spent 7.4 percentage points fewer of their middle school 
years in accelerated math coursework than did their white and Asian peers in the same school 
and of the same skill. For the 2012 and 2013 cohorts, this race gap had dropped to a statistically 
insignificant 1-2 percentage points. There is little consistent evidence of a substantial gender gap 
in acceleration rates, conditional on skill. F-statistics associated with testing the joint significance 
of the income and race indicators dropped from 86 to 4-6 across these cohorts, although they 
remain statistically significant. Nevertheless, we interpret this substantial drop in F-statistics 
together with the patterns in regression coefficients as indication that the new EVAAS score-
based assignment rule reduced the role of income and race in the math acceleration decision — 
the original goal of the policy — by increasing the role of academic skill in that assignment 
process over the time period examined.  
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The substantial differences in academic skill and other factors between accelerated and 
non-accelerated students  would severely bias a simple comparison of these two groups’ 
outcomes. To cleanly identify the impact of math acceleration on student standardized test 
performance, course grades, course-taking and other outcomes, we exploit the fact that WCPSS 
chose an EVAAS predicted probability of 70% as the cutoff for assignment to accelerated math 
coursework. This fact  allows us to use a regression discontinuity (RD) design  to compare 
outcomes of students just above and below that threshold. These two groups of students are 
nearly identical in all ways except that the former group was recommended for acceleration 
while the latter was not. As such, comparison of these two groups near the threshold should yield Algebra access and advancement 
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estimates unbiased by differences in prior academic achievement or other student characteristics. 
Of course, a limitation of this approach is that estimated impacts of acceleration that are derived 
from the regression discontinuity analysis are local to those students near the 70% cutoff, or 
those students who are around the 25
th percentile of the achievement, as determined by the 
EVAAS measure.  
The EVAAS predicted probability of success in Algebra I therefore serves as our forcing 
variable, the variable utilized to assign students exogenously to either the treatment group, those 
invited to accelerated math courses, or the control group, those not invited to such acceleration. 
Because EVAAS scores are recalculated after each grade to incorporate new standardized test 
scores and because math acceleration may affect such  scores and thus subsequent EVAAS 
values, EVAAS scores calculated at the end of 6
th and 7
th grades may be partly endogenous to 
the policy itself. We therefore use as a forcing variable each student’s EVAAS score as 
calculated at the end of 5
th grade, prior to the point in time when middle school math acceleration 
could have affected that score.  
Our use of RD  is consistent with the guidelines presented by the What Works 
Clearinghouse (Schochet et al, 2010). First, the invitation to enroll in accelerated mathematics is 
based on a clear, clean assignment rule. Students with a predicted probability of 70% or greater 
are invited to take an accelerated math course and those with a probability below 70% are not. 
Second, the forcing variable is ordinal, as it is a probability predicted from a multivariate model, 
and therefore has numerous possible values on either side of the cutoff. Third, it is utilized by 
WCPSS only for assigning students to math courses, so that no other factors are confounded with 
the forcing variable.  Algebra access and advancement 
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For the RD approach to yield valid causal inference, subjects must not be able to 
manipulate the forcing variable. Given that the EVAAS probability is a predicted value based on 
a proprietary model with multiple inputs, manipulation would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Support for this supposition comes from the fact that, while WCPSS selected the cutoff criteria 
of 70%, SAS was responsible for generating the probability values, and the underlying model is 
not made public. Second, the cutoff scores are a function of prior standardized test performance 
and students likely have neither sufficient technical knowledge of the policy nor sufficient 
capability to manipulate their own test performance to impact their placement on the continuum 
of the forcing variable directly on either side of the cutoff. Additionally, for the earliest cohorts, 
students sat for standardized tests prior to the development of the prediction model or assignment 
policy and could not have anticipated it being implemented. 
To confirm this reasoning, we examine the integrity of the forcing variable graphically. 
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the forcing variable for all students in the main analysis sample, 
with Panel A showing the full sample and Panel B showing the sub-sample that the RD analysis 
will focus on. The threshold value of 70% is marked with a vertical dashed line. We observe no 
discrete change in the density at the threshold, suggesting no obvious manipulation of the 
EVAAS scores. Though this figure presents the distribution for students across all grades and 
school years, tests and figures disaggregated by grade and school year look similarly smooth.  
While students are recommended for accelerated mathematics if they have a 70% or 
higher EVAAS probability, not all eligible students enroll in the recommended course, and some 
ineligible students do manage their way  into the accelerated  courses regardless. The 
discrepancies between eligibility and take-up mean that the probability of a student enrolling in 
an accelerated mathematics course does not jump sharply from zero to one at the 70% threshold. Algebra access and advancement 
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As a result, we will model the relationship between our outcome and the EVAAS probability as a 
“fuzzy” regression discontinuity (Imbens & Lemeiux, 2008; Murnane & Willett, 2011). We 
explain our strategy with respect to a generic outcome Y, such as a standardized test score or 
course grade. 
We employ a two-stage approach using instrumental variables to estimate the effect of 
participating in accelerated mathematics on our outcome Y. We first use each student’s position 
relative to the probability cutoff as an instrument for enrollment in accelerated mathematics. For 
the first stage, we use local linear regression to fit the following linear probability model for 
student i in cohort c, grade g and initial middle school s: 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝗽2𝐶𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝗽3(𝐶𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆 × 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺)𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + µ𝑐𝑔𝑠+ 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 
 
                  .  
where ACCEL is an indicator for enrollment in an accelerated math course, and ELIG is an 
indicator for a student’s end of 5
th grade EVAAS score exceeding 70%. CEVAAS is a student’s 
EVAAS score re-centered around that threshold,  such that 𝗽2  represents  the slope  of the 
relationship between the probability of acceleration and EVAAS to the left of the threshold. The 
interaction between CEVAAS and ELIG allows that slope to differ to the right of the threshold. 
We  include  cohort-by-grade-by-school fixed effects, which improves the precision of our 
estimates but has little impact on their magnitude, as would be expected given that the threshold 
is the same throughout the district. The coefficient on the eligibility indicator, 𝗽1, therefore 
represents the difference in math acceleration rates between students just above and just below 
the eligibility threshold in the same cohort, grade and school.   
Because we are still in the process of obtaining data on student outcomes, we focus in 
this paper on documenting that first stage itself. In particular, we assess the extent to which the Algebra access and advancement 
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assignment rule was followed. We will show that the assignment rule was followed closely 
enough that ELIG is a strong enough instrument to allow us later to identify the impact of math 
acceleration on student outcomes. The second-stage model that we will use in future research is 
given by:  
 
𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝜋2𝐶𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝜋3(𝐶𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑆 × 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺)𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝗾𝑐𝑔𝑠 + 𝗿𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑠 
 
 
where Y represents outcomes such as test scores and course grades, and ACCEL is instrumented 
by eligibility as in the first-stage equation above. Based on this model, the parameter of interest 
will thus be 𝜋1, the effect of participating in accelerated mathematics for students who were 
accelerated because of the assignment rule. This estimate represents a local average treatment 
effect for “compliers”, those students near the threshold who took accelerated math coursework 
only because of the cutoff rule and who would not have enrolled had the rule not existed 
(Angrist, Imbens & Rubin, 1996). These students would not have chosen themselves or been 
chosen by their schools to enroll in accelerated coursework but are induced to do so by the new 
eligibility rule. Our identification strategy thus relies on the fact that there are two nearly 
identical sub-groups of students on either side of the threshold who would not have taken 
accelerated math coursework in the absence of the new policy. The policy thus quasi-randomly 
induces one sub-group to enroll but leaves the other untouched. While there would be empirical 
advantages  to a true randomized trial, in this context  randomization would simply not be 
politically palatable for the district and therefore not feasible to implement.  Therefore, the 
regression discontinuity design provides a particularly attractive alternative.  
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FIRST STAGE RESULTS 
Before turning to the first stage results, we note that our primary specification here uses 
local linear regression,  a  triangular kernel, a  bandwidth of 15  EVAAS points, and clusters 
standard errors by initial middle school. Though not shown in detail here, the results presented 
below are robust to alternative weighting such as rectangular kernels (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008), 
a variety of  bandwidths, including those suggested by other optimal bandwidth selection 
methods (Calonico et al., forthcoming; Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2012; Ludwig & Miller; 2007) 
and inclusion of covariates. That inclusion of covariates does not affect our central estimates is 
unsurprising given that the inability to manipulate the EVAAS score theoretically suggests that 
students’ demographic characteristics should be balanced across the threshold. We confirm this 
in Table 3, which tests for discontinuities in demographic characteristics at the threshold by 
running our first-stage specification with various covariates as outcomes. All of the available 
covariates appear balanced across the threshold, suggesting that our treatment and control groups 
look quite similar in terms of race, income, special education and LEP status, age and gender.  
We first show the graphical representation of the first-stage relationship between 
students’ EVAAS scores and the probability of enrolling in accelerated math coursework. Figure 
4 show this relationship by grade and school year, with the top row representing the 2010-11 
school year during which the new assignment policy was first implemented.  The largely 
untreated 2009 cohort is thus represented in the upper right box, as they were 8
th graders in the 
2010-11 school year and show little evidence of a discontinuity in acceleration rates near the 
threshold. 
The 2010 cohort, who were 7
th graders in 2010-11 and 8
th graders in 2011-12, show 
clearer discontinuities, with students just above the threshold noticeably more likely to be Algebra access and advancement 
24 
 
accelerated in both 7
th and 8
th grades compared to those just below the threshold. The subsequent 
2011-2013 cohorts, all of whom started middle school under the new assignment rule, show 
substantial discontinuities in acceleration rates as well. These discontinuities seem particularly 
striking in 7
th grade, though the most recent 2013 cohort shows a substantial discontinuity in 6
th 
grade, the one year for which we can currently observe them. Overall, these graphs suggest that 
the new assignment rule has been more and more faithfully implemented over time and will 
serve as a strong source of exogenous variation in the probability of a given student being 
accelerated in math. 
Figure 5 provides an alternative way of measuring the strength of the first stage. Here, we 
define the treatment as the fraction of each student’s observed middle school years spent in 
accelerated math coursework. We then pool the 2010-13 cohorts, which yields a much less noisy 
figure than those separated by grade and school year. The discontinuity here is striking. Students 
just below the eligibility threshold spend less than 40% of their middle school years in 
accelerated coursework, whereas those just above the threshold spend about 55% of their time in 
such coursework, on average.  
We confirm this graphical intuition in Table 4  by  fitting  the first-stage regressions 
described previously. The top row uses as an outcome the fraction of each student’s observed 
middle school years spent in accelerated math coursework. The remaining rows use as an 
outcome an indicator for being accelerated in a given grade and year. The first column represents 
the untreated 2009 cohort, while the second through fifth columns represent the treated 2010-13 
cohorts. The final column pools all four treated cohorts. 
As expected, there is no evidence that the eligibility threshold affected math acceleration 
rates in the 2009 cohort’s first two years, prior to the policy’s introduction. In 8
th grade, there is Algebra access and advancement 
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small and only marginally significant evidence of an impact for that cohort in the policy’s first 
year.  For the 2010 cohort, which was in 7
th  grade when the new policy began, eligibility 
increases the fraction of middle school years spent in accelerated math by 7.3 percentage points. 
This fraction rises monotonically across subsequent cohorts, so that eligibility increases the 
fraction of years accelerated by 28.3 percentage points for the 2013 cohort. Pooling all four 
treated cohorts leads to an average estimated first-stage effect of 13.4 percentage points. For the 
pooled sample, the F statistic for the eligibility coefficient is nearly 50, well beyond the threshold 
of 10 suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) for a strong instrument. The second through 
fourth rows show that much of the strength of this instrument comes from particularly strong 
impacts in 7
th grade acceleration decisions, though smaller effects in 6
th and 8
th grade are still 
highly statistically significant.  
Table  5  explores  potential channels through which acceleration might impact later 
outcomes by estimating how acceleration affects the peers and teachers to which students are 
exposed in their primary math classes. Each coefficient shows the estimated impact of current 
acceleration status, where acceleration has been instrumented with eligibility. Relative to non-
accelerated students, those accelerated because of the assignment rule end up with peers who are 
1.1  standard deviations higher in math skill as measured by their 5
th  grade math scores. 
Interestingly, these two sets of classes have similar standard deviations in such math skill, so that 
acceleration does not change the heterogeneity of skill to which students are exposed. 
Accelerated students end up in classes that are 4.2 students larger. They have peers who are more 
than  20 percentage points less  likely to be low-income, black or Hispanic, though gender 
composition is unchanged. There is little evidence that acceleration affects the quality of 
students’ math teachers on average, though we do see suggestive evidence that accelerated Algebra access and advancement 
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students are less likely to be assigned teachers with value-added measures one standard deviation 
below the mean. In total, these results suggest that acceleration exposes students to higher skilled 
peers and possibly fewer low quality teachers, which might have positive effects, but also to 
larger class sizes, which might have negative effects. Based on these results, it is worth noting 
that because of the structure of the policy, students on different sides of the EVAAS threshold 
had mathematics classroom experiences that different not only in terms of curriculum and course 
content but also in terms of the composition of their classroom.  In this respect, the treatment that 
we are assessing with our regression discontinuity design is multi-dimensional in nature and not 
necessarily the effect of a more advanced mathematics curriculum exclusively.   
Finally,  Table  6  replicates the first row of Table 4, interacting all right-hand side 
variables with income,  race  or gender  indicators in order to study whether the district was 
enforcing the EVAAS threshold rule differently for different groups of students. The first and 
second panels suggest that the assignment rule is applied similarly across students of different 
income levels but slightly more strictly to black and Hispanic students than to white and Asian 
students. Consistent with Table 2, we see small differences in acceleration rates by income and 
race conditional on EVAAS scores.
5 The third panel suggests that the assignment rule is applied 
somewhat more strictly to male students than to female students, with the difference between the 
two discontinuity coefficients being marginally significant. Again consistent with Table 2, the 
female coefficient suggests that, conditional on EVAAS score, female students are no more 
likely to be accelerated than male students. Overall, these results suggest that the assignment rule 
is being applied fairly similarly across student subgroups.  
 
                                                            
5 These coefficients are less precisely estimated than their equivalent coefficients in Table 2 because that table 




Findings from our initial investigation of the WCPSS math acceleration policy suggest 
that overall participation in accelerated mathematics courses has increased as a result, and that 
the assignment policy has been applied equally across student subgroups defined by gender and 
by race / ethnicity. In addition to increasing overall participation in accelerated mathematics, this 
assignment strategy has also resulted in girls being represented in accelerated math courses in 
proportion to their enrollment in the district. In contrast, however, while enrollment rates for 
black students and Hispanic students also improved substantially over their pre-policy levels, 
neither group of students has achieved representation in accelerated  courses in way that is 
proportional to their overall share of district enrollment. This last fact underscores that policies 
that base assignment solely on demonstrated ability may not be sufficient to ameliorate long-
standing imbalances in access to important academic steppingstones. Nevertheless, our analyses 
do reveal that policies such as these can serve to diminish the extent to which factors such as 
income and race relate to course placement, at least conditional on student achievement. 
Yet to be known is whether the rule-based assignment policy in Wake County has a 
meaningful impact on student-level measures of school engagement and academic performance. 
In subsequent analyses, we will utilize course-taking, course-grades, standardized test scores, 
attendance, discipline, and college-going as policy-relevant outcomes of interest in both the short 
and long term. Earlier work in Chicago that provided algebra instruction for all 9
th-grade students 
in the district suggests that accelerating students into algebra may result in mixed short-term 
academic benefits as measured by test scores (Allensworth et al., 2009; Nomi & Allensworth, 
2009), but that there may be a long-term payoff in the way of college going for students 
impacted by this policy (Cortes et al., forthcoming). The continued work is especially important Algebra access and advancement 
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given that clear differences exist between the educational contexts of Chicago and Wake County 
and the potential usefulness of these outcome data for education policy in a variety of contexts. 
Our ongoing access to and use of the longitudinal data from WCPSS will add to the existing 
literature on math acceleration and algebra access policies, while providing relevant feedback on 
the policy’s impact on student outcomes in its local context. 
  It is important to emphasize that without our research partnership with WCPSS, there 
would be no prospect for establishing or continuing this line of investigation. Further,  the 
district’s continued maintenance of its longitudinal data systems as well as its commitment to 
using these data to measure ongoing impact and to improve equity of both practice and outcomes 
make this work possible. Thus, the WCPSS policy and this research partnership through the 
Strategic Data Project serve as a compelling example of how cooperation among researchers and 
education agencies can leverage existing data to answer important questions about the impact of 
innovative policies. Our aim is that collaborative efforts such as these will yield fruit both for 
informing the broader research community as well as organization-level decision making in 
educational agencies which are often data rich but comparatively limited in terms of analytic 
capacity.  
This issue of EEPA is a signal that the education policy research community strives to 
build stronger bridges to and partnerships with education agencies in order to apply rigorous 
analytic tools to policy questions of the highest importance. We believe that this is the right 
direction for the field. Yet, our own experience has reminded us collectively to remain cognizant 
of the potential risks and controversies that can be generated by education policies and efforts to 
assess their impact, such as our efforts with WCPSS. For example, though the incentive structure 
within the academic community clearly favors the presentation of work in progress, the risks Algebra access and advancement 
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associated with the potential misuse and misunderstanding of early findings is borne 
disproportionately by the partnering educational agency.  If policy innovation, research 
partnerships, and the honest evaluation of educational policies using experimental and quasi-
experimental methods are to be furthered, the utmost care must be taken to honor the interests 
and working realities of the students, community members, educators  and agency leaders 
involved.  
Finally, the WCPSS  middle grades mathematics acceleration policy is emblematic of 
policies that are established in ways that allow for high-quality and causally identified impact 
analyses, and our subsequent analyses will seek to understand  finer-grained variation in the 
implementation of the policy across school contexts and the impacts of this policy on student 
outcomes in both the short and long term. If our investigation suggests this as a broadly feasible 
and promising strategy for improving students’ access to rigorous and appropriate coursework in 
mathematics, the WCPSS course assignment strategy will serve as an example for other districts 
considering similar policy goals and actions. WCPSS’s use of the EVAAS measure, specifically, 
should not serve as a limiting factor for other districts considering ways to provide objective 
access to school resources or curricula. In addition to understanding impacts ultimately, research 
partnerships also serve as a potential opportunity for constructing measures analogous to the 
EVAAS predicted probability, or for finding ways to identify other approaches for implementing 
district-  or school-level policies so that their impact on student outcomes can be rigorously 
understood.  
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4Figure 5: Fraction of Years in Accelerated Math 0.2.4.6.8Fraction of years accelerated55 70 85 EVAAS (earliest)
5Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
All students Accelerated Non-accelerated
(A) Controls
Female 0.501 0.504 0.495
White 0.509 0.598 0.304
Asian 0.062 0.079 0.024
Black 0.247 0.171 0.425
Hispanic 0.135 0.106 0.203
Other race 0.046 0.046 0.044
Poor 0.375 0.266 0.630
Special education 0.351 0.366 0.316
Limited English proﬁciency 0.161 0.138 0.213
Age on September 1 13.299 13.262 13.386
(B) Math course and skills
Accelerated 0.699 1.000 0.000
EVAAS (most recent) 80.671 91.824 54.171
EVAAS (earliest) 83.051 92.868 60.235
5th grade math z-score 0.032 0.421 -0.884
(C) Math course peer composition
Mean 5th grade math z-score 0.018 0.412 -0.898
SD 5th grade math z-score 0.629 0.617 0.655
Class size 26.243 27.719 22.811
Fraction black or Hispanic 0.429 0.327 0.666
Fraction female 0.499 0.502 0.492
N 82,359 57,584 24,775
Notes: Mean values of key variables are shown for all students in the 2010-2013 cohorts.
6Table 2: Decreasing Role of Demographics in Math Acceleration Process
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
cohort cohort cohort cohort cohort
EVAAS (earliest) 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Low income -0.105 -0.077 -0.077 -0.020 -0.032
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
Black/Hispanic -0.074 -0.044 -0.040 -0.005 -0.017
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Female 0.003 0.008 0.016 0.002 0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant -0.120 -0.256 -0.274 -0.188 -0.386
(0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.057) (0.051)
R2 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.62
F(income,race) 86.1 41.3 36.7 4.0 5.7
N 9,286 9,381 9,267 9,607 9,752
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by initial middle school are in parentheses (* p<.10
** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each column uses OLS to estimate the relationship between the fraction of middle school
years spent in accelerated math coursework and earliest EVAAS score, income, race and gender. Each regression
includesschool-by-gradeﬁxedeffects. Thesampleconsistsofthelastmiddleschoolyearobservedforeachstudent
in the listed cohort. Below each column are F-tests of the joint signiﬁcance of the income and race coefﬁcients.
The p-values associated with those F-tests are all less than 0.01.
7Table 3: McCrary and Covariate Balance Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Black/ Low Special Age on
Count Hispanic income ed. LEP Sept. 1 Female
Eligible -2.573 0.000 -0.034 -0.032 0.020 0.017 -0.002
(2.600) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.018) (0.031) (0.027)
 52.52 0.70 0.65 0.22 0.21 13.30 0.53
N 261 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by initial middle school are in parentheses (* p<.10
** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each coefﬁcient is the reduced form estimate of the relationship between eligibility for
accelerationand the listcovariate. The coefﬁcientsshown aregenerated by locallinear regressionusing atriangular
kernelofbandwidth15, includingcohort-by-school-by-gradeﬁxedeffects. Theﬁrstcolumnusesasanoutcomethe
number of observations in each year, grade and 1-point wide EVAAS bin. Also listed is the mean of the covariate






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Table 5: Peer and Teacher Characteristics in Primary Math Classroom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A) Peers Mean St. dev. Class Fraction Fraction Fraction
math skill math skill size female low inc. black/Hisp.
Accelerated 1.079 -0.016 4.154 0.007 -0.241 -0.225
(0.088) (0.037) (1.097) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031)
N 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010 16,010
(B) Teachers VAM Low Years Novice Female Missing
estimate VAM of exp. teacher teacher teacher
Accelerated 0.284 -0.213 0.138 0.014 0.142 -0.038
(0.298) (0.100) (1.223) (0.040) (0.086) (0.056)
N 14,110 14,110 12,649 12,649 12,713 16,010
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by initial middle school are in parentheses (* p<.10
** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each panel shows instrumental variables estimates of the impact of acceleration, where
acceleration is instrumented with eligibility. The coefﬁcients shown are generated by local linear regression using
a triangular kernel of bandwidth 15, including cohort-by-school-by-grade ﬁxed effects. In panel B, low VAM
is deﬁned as having an estimated VAM more than one standard deviation below average, and the ﬁnal column’s
outcome is an indicator for missing information about a student’s primary math teacher. The sample includes the
2010-13 cohorts.
10Table 6: First Stage Impacts, By Gender, Income and Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2010-2013 2010 2011 2012 2013
cohorts cohort cohort cohort cohort
(A) Income
Non-poor * Eligible 0.140 0.124 0.049 0.185 0.265
(0.023) (0.049) (0.039) (0.046) (0.087)
Poor * Eligible 0.129 0.042 0.113 0.187 0.285
(0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.049) (0.090)
Poor -0.030 -0.001 -0.044 -0.040 -0.089
(0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.058) (0.080)
p 0.75 0.14 0.18 0.97 0.86
N 16,010 4,910 4,956 4,010 2,134
(B) Race
White/Asian * Eligible 0.097 0.092 0.011 0.099 0.264
(0.025) (0.035) (0.046) (0.045) (0.078)
Black/Hispanic * Eligible 0.152 0.066 0.124 0.236 0.286
(0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.047) (0.094)
Black/Hispanic -0.027 0.012 -0.045 -0.040 -0.085
(0.026) (0.022) (0.046) (0.062) (0.070)
p 0.10 0.57 0.04 0.05 0.85
N 16,010 4,910 4,956 4,010 2,134
(C) Gender
Male * Eligible 0.160 0.087 0.131 0.203 0.314
(0.018) (0.031) (0.037) (0.052) (0.068)
Female * Eligible 0.111 0.063 0.051 0.171 0.259
(0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.049) (0.098)
Female 0.035 0.004 0.037 0.017 0.128
(0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.047) (0.074)
p 0.08 0.56 0.08 0.67 0.58
N 16,010 4,910 4,956 4,010 2,134
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by initial middle school are in parentheses (* p<.10 **
p<.05 *** p<.01). First stage estimates show the impact of eligibility for acceleration on the fraction of middle
school years spent in accelerated math coursework. The coefﬁcients shown are generated by local linear regression
using a triangular kernel of bandwidth 15, including cohort-by-school-by-grade ﬁxed effects. These replicate the
regressions from the top row of Table 4, interacting the independent variables with indicators for income, race
or gender. Also shown is a p-value from an F-test of the equality of the two interaction coefﬁcients shown. The
sample includes the 2010-13 cohorts.
11